Update, November 2026: Since this article was first published in 2023, the Online Safety Bill has become law as the Online Safety Act. The power that would allow Ofcom to require messaging services to scan private messages remains in the Act, although the government said it would only be used once doing so was technically feasible. The wider fight over encryption has continued, including Apple withdrawing its Advanced Data Protection feature from the UK in 2025 after an order under a separate law, the Investigatory Powers Act. The arguments below matter as much today as they did then.

The Historical Role of Encryption

Encryption and the wider use of cryptography have been part of human civilisation for thousands of years. The first form, manual cryptography, can be traced back to ancient Greece, when the Spartan state used scytale ciphers to encrypt their military communications. A more advanced method, the Caesar Cipher, was used by successive Roman Emperors to encrypt communications across the empire for centuries.

By the early 20th century, the second cryptography stage, electromechanical encryption and decryption, was born. Most famously, Enigma, a rotor and gear based machine, was used by the Nazis during WWII. This vastly superior method to manual cryptography was broken by the mathematician and computer pioneer Alan Turing and his team at Bletchley Park.

The third cryptography stage, digital encryption, is today an integral part of our lives, protecting our online interactions, from emails to financial transactions. Modern day apps such as WhatsApp, Signal and iMessage use end-to-end encryption (E2EE) to ensure the private and secure transfer of data from one party to another. Unlike all other previous encryption methods, E2EE means no one, including the company that created the application in question, can “unlock” the data and see its contents.

The Online Safety Bill

E2EE technology has been deeply unsettling for governments and law enforcement agencies around the world, who have long argued that E2EE hinders their ability to counter terrorism and child exploitation. We are told that E2EE allows criminals, terrorists, and abusers to carry out their crimes freely and therefore action must be taken.

It’s for this reason that part of the UK’s much delayed and amended Online Safety Bill attempts to address this. The proposed legislation as it currently stands would give the UK regulator Ofcom the power to compel messaging platforms to detect and report illegal content such as child exploitation images. Or to put it another way, to use your phone to continuously scan your private messages for illegal content.

Any decent human being wants to protect children from harm, so what’s the problem?

The problem is that this legislation has potentially hugely negative political, economic, social, and technological implications and the proposed solution does little to provide the protection it claims. Let’s look at the technological and social implications first.

Technological & Social Implications

Technology companies have long argued against requests from law enforcement for ‘backdoors’ to their apps and services. A backdoor created by the app or service provider would act as a key that law enforcement officials could use to break into previously encrypted communications, to monitor conversations.

The issue for all of us is that once encryption is broken, it can be exploited by hackers or governments for unintended and malicious purposes, such as cybercrime, state surveillance, and the abuse of online privacy and human rights.

Not so, say government experts from GCHQ, the UK’s intelligence agency, who argue that it is possible to ‘provide both user privacy and security, while protecting child safety and enabling law enforcement action’. This is due to ‘client-side scanning’ (CSS), a technology that scans devices using a technique known as “neural hashing”. The scanning takes place on a user’s device rather than through the provider and therefore - according to its advocates - does not interfere with E2EE between a sender and receiver.

But the fact remains that CSS does break the E2EE premise, that a message between a sender and the recipient should not be interfered with. And a landmark report in 2021, ‘Bugs in Our Pockets’, written by 14 venerated cryptographers argues that ‘CSS by its nature creates serious security and privacy risks for all society while the assistance it can provide for law enforcement is at best problematic.'

CSS is problematic because there are so many technical ways in which it can be evaded by the criminals it is supposed to target. It is also susceptible to false positives, algorithmic bias and software bugs. Even if CSS is successfully deployed to counter child abuse images, the pressure to subsequently expand its scope would be enormous. Perhaps political comments or opinions governments don’t like? The genie would be out of the bottle.

Political & Economic Effects

The potential political and economic effects of the proposed Online Safety Bill and encryption are also detrimental and present striking contradictions.

Several messaging apps and privacy advocates recently wrote an open letter urging the UK government to rethink its E2EE plans. Services such as WhatsApp and Signal have both made it clear they would rather walk away from the UK than adhere to any law that undermines E2EE.

How would it look if the UK, an aspiring tech superpower, joined China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria, where WhatsApp does not operate? What kind of message would undermining encryption send at a time when technology companies are already shunning the FTSE 100 in favour of US listings and London is losing its lustre for fintechs?

The UK government has banned TikTok from government devices in case the Chinese government is using the app to scan devices. But the Online Safety Bill would effectively give Ofcom a similar ability to continuously scan devices in the UK.

The Open Rights Group refers to this as a ‘spy in your pocket’ and points out that the Online Safety Bill would give the UK some of the most extreme surveillance powers of any democracy. The National Union of Journalists is also concerned, saying the legislation ‘risks undermining the security of confidential communications between journalists and sources’.

The encryption debate will continue to rage on and pressure will mount as calls on technology companies to build backdoors increase. We all want to fight child abuse and terrorism, but undermining end-to-end encryption is not the answer. It would have little effect in reducing criminal activity and would fundamentally damage our right to privacy, threaten free speech and indeed, democracy itself.

Encryption is at the heart of a trusted internet, an enabler of both economic benefits and human rights. It is a fight for online privacy we must win.